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Abstract
The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to
increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency.
Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desired over a
series of binary decisions. By accumulating votes on issues that it deems
most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the ma-
jority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only if its strength of
preference is high and the majority’s strength of preference is low. The
result is that with storable votes, aggregate efficiency either falls little or
in fact rises. The theoretical predictions of our model are confirmed by
a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative
payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all
match the theory.
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1 Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed great efforts at designing democratic institutions,
at many levels. New constitutions were created in much of Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Republics, international organizations such as the European
Union and the World Trade Organization have been evolving rapidly, and many
developing countries have moved from autocratic regimes to regimes based on
elected representation with majoritarian principles.
While majoritarian principles may provide a solid foundation for democ-
racy, there are imperfections. This paper focuses on one particular imperfec-
tion, which has presented a challenge to designers of democratic institutions for
centuries: the tyranny of the majority, or the risk of excluding minority groups
from representation. At least since Madison, Mill, and Tocqueville, political
thinkers have argued that a necessary condition for the legitimacy of a demo-
cratic system is for no group with acceptable goals to be disenfranchised. The
dangers posed by the tyranny of the majority are not of pure academic interest,
as the threat or reality of civil wars around the world makes painfully clear.
According to a leading constitutional law textbook: ”This issue is one of
the most difficult in political and constitutional theory: how to design political
institutions that both reflect the right of ”the people” to be self-governing and
that also ensure appropriate integration of and respect for the interests of polit-
ical minorities” (Issacharoff, Karlan and Pildes, 2002, p.673). In the history of
US constitutional law, ensuring fair representation to each group is seen as the
crucial second step in the evolution of democratic institutions, after granting
the franchise: once all individuals are guaranteed the right to participate in the
political process, the question becomes the appropriate weights given to each
group’s political interest. The core of the difficulty is that the two goals seem
inherently contradictory.
One possible remedy is recourse to the judiciary system: it amounts to guar-
anteeing basic rights in the fundamental laws of the country and appealing to
the courts when such rights are imperiled. Although this approach can prevent
abuses, it does not address the subtler problem of ensuring minority represen-
tation when the preferences of the minority, as opposed to its basic rights, are
sytematically neglected. For this, the correct design of the political institutions
is required. In this paper, we approach the problem from the perspective of
voting theory, and propose a simple voting mechanism that, without violating
the basic principle of ”one-person one-vote,” allows the minority to win occa-
sionally. The mechanism is not based on supermajorities, avoiding the costs of
inertia and inefficiency they can entail, nor on geographical partitions, with the
inevitable arbitrariness and instability of redistricting. But before describing
our solution to the tyranny of the majority problem some clarification is useful.
The topic of minorities is felt so intensely, and the terms are so emotionally
loaded that there is a need to be scrupulously clear in terminology. We define
a minority as a clearly identifiable group characterized by two features: first,
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a small numerical size, smaller than the majority; second, preferences that are
systematically different from the preferences of the majority. Thus, a minority
in this paper is a political minority, which may, but need not, correspond to a
minority according to racial, ethnic, religious or any other type of considerations.
In terms of political decisions, what matters are the coherent and idiosyncratic
preferences of the group, as opposed to its sense of identity.
The need to represent minority interests is usually argued on the basis of
fairness and legitimacy. But efficiency considerations can be relevant too, and
it is on grounds of efficiency that we defend our case here. Chwe (1999) took a
similar perspective, arguing for granting ”special” voting power to the minor-
ity to ensure its participation when voting aggregates diffuse information. We
base our analysis on private value considerations - voting in our model aggre-
gates divergent preferences, not diffuse information. But the efficiency rationale
remains. A simple example will illustrate why.
Suppose there are just two groups in a polity comprised of 100 citizens.
Group A has 55 members and group B has 45 members. There are 3 proposals
on the table. All citizens in group A have identical preferences and strictly
prefer to pass all proposals; all citizens in group B have identical preferences
and strictly prefer the status quo on all 3 issues. Thus, group B fits our definition
of a minority. Table 1 gives a specific utility function for each member on each
issue, and preferences are assumed to be additive. For each citizen, the utility
of the less preferred option is normalized to 0.
Issue UA(pass) UA(sq) UB(pass) UB(sq)
1 3 0 0 1
2 2 0 0 2
3 1 0 0 3
Note that the intensity of preferences varies across the issues, and on a given
issue the preference intensity for a group A member may be different from the
intensity of a group B member. That is, some issues are ”more important” to
one group than to the other group - issue 1 is important to group A but not to
group B, and issue 3 is important to group B but not to group A.
Now consider what would happen with simple majority rule when issues are
decided independently: since group A has a majority, all three proposals pass.
Indeed, even if there were a million different issues, group A would always have
a majority on all issues, so the B citizens are effectively disenfranchised - the
outcome is exactly the same as it would be in a political system where only A
citizens were allowed to vote.
Why is this outcome undesirable? First, equity considerations demand that
the minority be able to win on at least some issues. But in addition, from a
purely utilitarian standpoint, there are plausible welfare criteria according to
which the outcome is socially inefficient. In our example, if each individual is
treated equally and decisions are evaluated ex ante, before membership into the
groups is known, the status quo should prevail on issue 3. Thus, the tyranny of
the majority imposes costs both in terms of equity and in terms of efficiency. The
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equity problem stems from the existence of a smaller group whose preferences are
systematically in the opposite direction of the larger group’s preferences. The
efficiency problem stems from differences in the strength of preferences of the
two groups. But nothing fundamental depends on all citizens in a group having
the same intensity of preferences on every issue, a simplification we adopted
here to keep the example transparent.1
Can the tyranny of the majority problem be solved? In our example, una-
nimity or any biting supermajority requirement would produce a stalemate and
prevent any decision being made. Any solution must deviate from issue-by-issue
simple majority voting system. An immediate possibility might be vote trading
or some corresponding log-rolling scheme: members of one group could trade
their vote on one issue in exchange for votes on other issues. But, in the simple
example we constructed above, there are no gains across groups, because every
A citizen is already winning on all issues. Any system that allows the minority
group to win on even one issue will make all A citizens worse off, and thus would
not emerge spontaneously through vote trading. With the perfect correlation
of preferences we have posited above, an explicit institution ”re-enfranchising”
the minority is necessary.
Consider then, endowing every voter with an initial stock of votes, and rather
than requiring voters to cast exactly one vote on each issue, allowing them to
lump their votes together, casting ”heavier” votes on some issues and ”lighter”
votes on other issues. It is this voting mechanism, called storable votes, that
we study in this paper. As we prove below, storable votes allow the minority
to win some of the time, and in particular, to win when its preferences are
most intense. And because the majority generally holds more votes, it is in a
position to overrule the minority if it cares to do so: the minority can win only
those issues over which its strength of preferences is high and, at the same time,
the majority’s preference intensity is weak. But these are exactly the issues
where the minority ”should” win from an efficiency viewpoint: the equity gains
resulting from the possibility of occasional minority’s victory need not come
at a cost to aggregate efficiency. In fact, in most of the examples we study
in this paper, we find that standard economic measures of aggregate efficiency
rise with storable votes. The main contribution of this paper then is not to
suggest a new reason to increase minority’s representation but to propose a
specific voting scheme with the potential to achieve this goal even in the case
of a systematic minority, when other voting mechanisms would fail, and to do
so without violating the equal treatment of all voters.
Storable votes were initially proposed in Casella (2005) (and independently,
in a somewhat different form, in Hortala-Vallve, 2004) in symmetric environ-
ments. The desirable efficiency properties of storable votes remain true there,
because the basic principle of casting more votes over decisions that matter
more continues to apply. The implication is that the probability of obtaining
1Nothing fundamental depends on the direction of preferences within the group being
perfectly correlated either - there may be some conflicting preferences within groups. We
have maintained the assumption throughout the paper, both to avoid complications and to
capture the focus of minority advocates on cohesive groups.
3
the desired outcome shifts away from decisions that matter little and towards
decisions that matter more, with positive welfare effects. Storable votes are
a particularly natural application of the idea that preferences can be elicited
by linking independent decisions through a common budget constraint, an idea
that can be exploited quite generally, as shown by Jackson and Sonnenschein
(forthcoming).2 But from a practical point of view it is in the application to
minorities that storable votes seem particularly promising, because the poten-
tial to increase efficiency is matched by desirable properties on equity grounds.
Even when the efficiency gains are not large, the equity considerations loom
large.
The observation that storable votes can be useful in increasing minority
representation is not surprising. One existing voting system similar to storable
votes is cumulative voting, a mechanism used in single multi-candidate elections.
It grants each voter a budget of votes, with the proviso that the votes can spread
or concentrated on as many or few of the candidates as the voter wishes. Cumu-
lative voting has been advocated for the protection of minority rights (Guinier,
1994) and has been recommended by the courts to redress violations of fair
representation in local elections (Issacharoff, Karlan and Pildes, 2002). There
is evidence, theoretical (Cox, 1990), experimental (Gerber, Morton and Rietz,
1998), and empirical (Bowler, Donovan and Brockington, 2003) that cumulative
voting does indeed work in the direction intended. The storable votes mecha-
nism is different in that it is applies to a series of independent binary decisions,
but the motivation is similar.
The desirable properties of storable votes are features of the equilibrium
of the resulting voting game – they emerge if every voter chooses the correct
number of votes, given what he rationally expects others to do. But, in practice
there is a need to consider the robustness of the mechanisms. Could the outcome
be much worse if voters made mistakes? This is an appropriate concern here
because the storable votes game is quite complex: voters need to trade-off the
different probabilities of casting the pivotal vote along the full logical tree of
possible scenarios, a task further complicated by coordination problems within
the two groups. If actual voters were confronted with the problem, what type
of decisions would they make?
The second part of the paper presents the results of a set of experiments. In
our experiments, the minority does indeed win with some frequency, and both
the minority payoff and the aggregate efficiency of the mechanism are quite
close to the theoretical predictions. This is less true of individual strategies: the
experimental subjects deviate frequently from the equilibrium number of votes.
What subjects do consistently, though, is to cast more votes when valuations are
higher, a behavior that appears sufficient to take them most of the way towards
their equilibrium payoffs. These conclusions are qualified by the different cost
2Jackson and Sonnenschein propose a specific mechanism that converges to the first best
allocation as the number of decisions grows large. The mechanism allows individuals to assign
different priority to different actions but constrains their choices in a tighly specified manner.
The design of the correct menu of choices offered to the agents is complex, but the mechanism
achieves the first best. Storable votes are simple but in general do not achieve the first best.
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of mistakes faced by majority members, who are likely to win anyway, and
minority members, whose deviations are particularly costly (and rarer in the
data). Previous experiments with storable votes in symmetric environments
(Casella, Gelman and Palfrey, forthcoming) had found a similar robustness of
efficiency properties to strategic mistakes, but the introduction of minorities
complicates the game very significantly. The ability of experimental subjects
on the minority side to appropriate a large share of the surplus available to
them was far from foretold, and we find it an encouraging sign of the practical
viability of the mechanism.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the basic model.
In section 3, we present theoretical results about the possibility of minority
victories and its effect on efficiency under storable votes. Section 4 describes
the experimental design and section 5 the experimental results. We conclude in
section 6. The Appendix discusses some of the proofs.
2 The Model
A committee with n members meets for T consecutive periods to vote over a
series of binary proposals {P1, ..., PT }, each of which can either pass or fail.
Voter i’s preferences over proposal Pt are summarized by a valuation vit ∈ R.
A positive valuation means that the voter is in favor of the proposal, a negative
valuation means that the voter is against, and voter i’s payoff from each proposal
is given by |vit| ≡ vit if the outcome of the vote is as he desires, and 0 otherwise.
Thus voter i’s utility function has the form:
Ui(P1, ...PT ) =
T∑
t−1
uit(Pt)
where
uit(Pt) = vit if{.vit > 0 and Pt passesvit < 0 and Pt fails
= 0 otherwise
The magnitude of the valuation, vit, is called the intensity of preferences of
voter i on proposal t. The profile of intensities, v= (v11, ...,v1T , ..,vn1, ...,vnT ),
is a random variable that is distributed according to the commonly known dis-
tribution Γ(v).
The committee is composed of two groups, the Majority group M, with
M members and the Minority group m, with m < M members. The two
groups differ systematically in their preferences: members of m are in favor of
all proposals, and members of M are against. For all t:
vit > 0 if i ∈m
vit < 0 if i ∈M
.
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All members of the minority have intensities drawn from a distribution Gm
with support [0, 1] while all members of the minority have intensities drawn
from a distribution Gm with support [−1, 0]. We assume symmetry in the
distribution across groups, so that if we call G′M (v) defined over the support
[0, 1] the distribution of the absolute valuations of majority voters, we set
Gm(v) = G′M (v) ≡ F (v). F (v) is common knowledge.
Intensities of preferences are drawn independently across the two groups.
With respect to the correlation of the intensity of preferences within each group,
we consider two polar cases. In the first case (case B), intensities are drawn
independently for each member of a group; in the second case (case C) intensities
are identical for all members within each group. Hence, in the B case members
of the same group may have conflicting priorities, while they do not in the C
case.The correlation of within group intensities (or lack thereof) is assumed to
be common knowledge
The intensity of these preferences v. At the beginning of period t, i pri-
vately observes vit but does not observe vit′ for t′ > t: intensities are revealed
privately and sequentially. Because draws are independent across issues, voter
i’s observation of vit does not provide information about vit′ , and because draws
are independent across groups, observation of vm does not provide information
about vM (and vice versa). Thus, voters do not know the intensity of their own
preferences in future periods and do not know the intensity of preferences of
the other group. However, in case C, members of the have identical preferences
and observation of their own intensity allows them to perfectly infer the prefer-
ences of the other members of their group, but gives them no information about
the intensities of voters in the other group. In case B, a voter’s own intensity
provides no information about any other voter’s intensities.
2.1 The Storable Votes Mechanism
At the beginning of period 1, each voter is endowed with an account of B0
”bonus” votes, and for most of our analysis we will think of B0 as an integer.3
In the first period, the voter casts his regular vote plus as many bonus votes as
he wishes out of his endowment. The bonus votes cast are deducted from his
endowment, which is then carried over to the next period. The current endow-
ment of bonus votes for every voter in period t, denoted Bt = (B1t, ..., Bnt), is
common knowledge at the beginning of period t. Thus each voter i indepen-
dently decides how many votes, xit, to cast after observing his private valuation
vit and Bt, subject to xit ≤ 1 + Bit. The proposal passes if there are more
votes in favor of the proposal than against, and fails in the opposite case. Ties
are resolved randomly. In the next period, t + 1, voters’ valuations over the
new proposal are again privately observed, and voting proceeds as before, now
subject to the constraint, xit+1 ≤ 1 + Bit+1 = 2 + Bit − xit. Since xit ≥ 1,
this is at least as tight a constraint as in period t. The voting continues in this
fashion until the end of period T .
3Because we want to study the effect of bonus votes per se in strengthening the minority’s
position, it seems appropriate to give the same initial allocation to all voters.
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3 Theoretical results
3.1 Equilibrium
Given F,m,M,B0, T the storable votes mechanism defines a multistage game
of incomplete information. We study the properties of the Perfect Bayesian
equilibria of this game, where at each period t and for each possible valuation,
vit, and profile of endowments, Bt, individuals choose how many votes to cast
so as to maximize expected utility, given the strategies of the other players. Be-
cause the sign of each group’s preferences is common knowledge and intensities
are independent over time, voting decisions cannot be used to manipulate other
players’ beliefs about future preferences. Assuming, in addition, that players
do not use weakly dominated strategies, the direction of each individual vote
is always chosen sincerely: all the minority members’ votes are cast in favor
of each proposal, and all majority votes are cast against each proposal. The
state of the game at t is defined to be the profile of bonus votes each voter has
still available, Bt, and the number of remaining periods, T − t. We focus on
strategies such that the number of votes each individual chooses to cast each
period, xit, depends only on the intensity of preferences at time t, vit, and the
state of the game. We denote such strategies by xit(vi, Bt, t).
3.2 The C2 game
When characterizing the equilibria of our model, the correlation of valuations
within each group in model C can be a source of complications. But matters can
be simplified by a simple observation. Consider the following 2-player storable
votes game, which we call C2. Voter M has M regular votes each period and a
stock ofMB0 bonus votes; his valuation over each proposal isMvMt where vMt
is independently drawn from the distribution function FM with support [−1, 0].
Voter m has m regular votes each period and a stock of mB0 bonus votes; his
valuation over each proposal is mvmt where vmt is independently drawn from
the distribution function Fm with support [0, 1]. Then the following result holds:
Lemma 1. If game C2 has an equilibrium, then the game described by model
C also has an equilibrium. In addition, call x∗Mt(vi, Bt, t) and x
∗
mt(vi, Bt, t) the
equilibrium strategies of voter M and voter m in game C2, and {x∗it(vi, Bt, t)}
the equilibrium strategies in C. If C2 has an equilibrium, then there exist
equilibrium strategies of model C such that
∑
i∈m x
∗
it(vi, Bt, t) = x
∗
mt(vi, Bt, t)
and
∑
i∈M x
∗
it(vi, Bt, t) = x
∗
Mt(vi, Bt, t).
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 makes a simple point. In model C voters’ interests within each
group are perfectly aligned; if there is an equilibrium where each group coor-
dinates its strategy so as to maximize the group’s payoff, given the aggregate
strategy of the other group, then no individual voter can gain from deviat-
ing.4 In the n-person game described by model C, we will call equilibrium
4This is the logic exploited by McLennan (1998) to show that ”sincere” voting must be a
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group strategies the equilibrium individual strategies of the 2-voter game C2.5
Lemma 1 allows us to show:
Lemma 2. Both model B and model C have an equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. In model B individual equilibrium strategies are monotone cutpoint strate-
gies; in model C, group strategies are monotone cutpoint strategies: at any state
(Bt, t) and for any i with ki = Bi + 1 available votes there exists a set of cut-
points {ci1(Bt, t), ci2(Bt, t), . . . , cik(Bt, t)}, 0 ≤ cix ≤ cix+1 ≤ 1, such that i will
cast x votes if and only if vit ∈ [cix, cix+1], where i ∈ {1, .., n} in model B and
i ∈ {M,m} in model C.
Proof. See Appendix.
The important point is that storable votes open the possibility of minority
victories. We can state:
Theorem 1. For any F , M and m and T > M , there always exists a
B˜0(F,M,m, T ) such that for all B0 > B˜0 in all equilibria of the storable votes
mechanism the minority is expected to win some of the time with strictly positive
probability (in both models B and C).
The intuition is the following. To guarantee itself victory all the time, the
majority needs to spread the bonus votes at its disposal over all proposals. If the
horizon is sufficiently long and the stock of bonus votes sufficiently large, at least
one proposal must exist over which the majority can be overruled with positive
probability even by a single minority voter concentrating his bonus votes..
3.3 Efficiency
We measure the efficiency of the storable votes mechanism in terms of ex ante
efficiency: a voter’s expected utility from all T proposals before any of his valua-
tions is realized, and before knowing whether he belongs toM or to m. We call
our efficiency measure EV0 and contrast it with the equivalent measure under
simple majority voting, denoted by EW0.6 Thus, from an efficiency perspective,
what is important is that the mechanism induces the minority to win ”when it
should”, i.e. when minority intensities outweigh majority intensities. This will
generally be the case due to monotonicity of the equilibrium voting strategies.
That is, in any given state, the number of votes cast by each group increases
Nash equilibrium in common value decision problems with information aggregation.
5Other equilibria are possible, where no individual voter can gain from deviating, although
the group’s (and thus each individual’s) payoff could be increased by joint group deviation.
6An important question is whether the cardinal values and our notion of efficiency force
us into comparisons of interpersonal utilities. This is where our assumption of symmetrical
distributions of (absolute) values across all voters plays its role. The valuation draws over any
specific decision should be read as normalized by a common numeraire. In our model with
multiple decisions, the natural numeraire is the individual’s mean valuation over the universe
of all decisions that could be brought to a vote. In fact, by imposing not only the same mean
but the same distribution, we are forcing the voters to adopt an equal scale and to organize the
different decisions according to a fixed ordinal ranking, with the same proportion of decisions
in any given subinterval of the support. It is this normalization that allows us to avoid
interpersonal comparisons. In this model, granting individual voters different distributions
would be equivalent to taking a stance on the relative intensity of their preferences.
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with the group’s intensity of preferences. Thus, the minority will tend to win
when its intensity of preferences is suffiently high compared to the majority.
The precise argument is complicated by the dynamic nature of the game, the
evolving budget constraint, the non-stationary strategies, and, in model B, by
the varying intensity of preferences within each group.
The intuition described above applies to both models, but the properties of
the voting mechanism are more robust and easier to characterize in model C.
Theorem 2. In model C, for all F and T , if m > 2 and M < 2m there
exists a value of B0 and an equilibrium of the storable votes mechanism such that
storable votes are ex ante superior to simple majority voting (i.e. EV0 > EW0).
Proof. See Appendix.
Both Theorems 1 and 2 rely on sufficient and rather restrictive conditions
that allow us to establish results for arbitrary F and T . But when we consider
an example, specializing the assumptions about F and T , the functioning of
the mechanism becomes more transparent. For this reason, and because the
example will guide the parameter choices in our experimental treatments we
discuss it below in some detail.
3.4 An Example: Uniform Valuations and Two Periods
We illustrate the results above with the following parametric example, which
corresponds to one of our experimental treatments. There are two proposals
(T = 2); each voter is endowed with two bonus votes in addition to his regular
votes (B0 = 2), and the total number n of voters is odd. The distribution F (v)
is Uniform. The strategy chosen by each voter is simply the number of bonus
votes to cast in period 1 the first proposal, after having learned his valuation
for proposal 1.
In model B there exists an equilibrium where all voters, whether in the
minority or in the majority, cast both bonus votes over the first proposal if the
intensity of their preferences is higher than . = 0.5, and none otherwise: xi1 = 1
if vi1 < 0.5 and xi1 = 3 if vi1 > 0.5 for all i. If M > 3m, the majority always
wins, but for all M ≤ 3m there exists an equilibrium where the minority wins
one of the two proposals with positive probability. Ex ante, each of the two
proposals has the same probability of a minority victory, and this probability
equals
∑m
s=k
[∑m−s
r=0
(
M
r
)(
m
r+s
)
2−n
]
> 0 where k ≡ (M −m+ 1)/2.
In model C, if 2M > 3m, the majority can ensure itself victory every time; if
2M ≤ 3m it cannot, and there exists an equilibrium in which the minority again
wins one proposal with positive probability. In this equilibrium, the minority
casts all bonus votes on the first proposal if the intensity of preferences is higher
than 0.5, and none otherwise; the majority follows the same strategy if M is
large enough, and splits some of its bonus votes otherwise: xm1 = m if vm1 < 0.5
and xm1 = 3m if vm1 > 0.5, while xM1 = max{M,m + 3} if vM1 < 0.5 and
xM1 = min{3M, 4M − (m+3)} if vM1 > 0.5. Again, ex ante each proposal has
the same probability of being the one won by the minority, and this probability
9
equals 0.25.7
The equilibria and their welfare properties are analyzed in more detail in
the Appendix and summarized in Figure 1. Efficiency is maximized when each
decision is resolved in favor of the side with higher total valuation, and in the
figure we compare equilibrium and ex post efficient outcomes.
Figure 1 here
The figure is drawn for the specific case M = m+ 1, but its qualitative fea-
tures hold generally and can easily be interpolated to the generic caseM = m+k
with k odd. Figure 1a shows, for both models, the probability of a minority
victory over either of the two proposals in equilibrium - the black dots - and
in the first best - the grey dots. As m increases, this results in an increase in
the probability of minority victories. In model B, the equilibrium probability
increases smoothly, converging to 0.5 as the number of voters becomes large
and the relative difference becomes negligible. The efficient frequency of mi-
nority victories is slightly higher than the equilibrium frequency. In model C,
the change in the equilibrium probability of minority victories is discontinuous,
jumping from 0 to 0.25 (when the majority becomes unable to guarantee vic-
tory on both proposals) and then remaining constant at that level. The point
at which the jump occurs depends on the absolute difference between the two
groups, k. The efficient frequency of minority victories on the other hand in-
creases smoothly with the relative size of the minority and is always higher than
the equilibrium frequency.
Figure 1b plots the expected per capita payoff for majority and minority
members. With simple majority rule, the respective values are 1 and 0 in both
models. With storable votes, the expected payoffs of the two groups are closer,
unless the majority can ensure itself victory, although the minority’s payoff
remains lower than under efficiency (grey dots in Figure 1b,). In model C,
equilibrium per capita payoffs remain constant for each group, regardless of m,
once the threshold where the majority always wins has been passed.8
Figure 1c plots a normalized measure of expected surplus for both models,
comparing storable votes and simple majority voting. For both mechanisms, we
calculate expected aggregate payoff as a share of the expected first best pay-
off. Because we want to measure the added value over purely random decision-
making (where each proposal is equally likely to pass or fail), we normalize both
numerator and denominator by the expected payoff in the random mechanism.
Thus if we call EV ∗ the expected efficient aggregate payoff and R the expected
payoff under random decision-making, we define the normalized aggregate sur-
plus as (EV − R)/(EV ∗ − R) with storable votes and (EW − R)/(EV ∗ − R)
with simple majority. Over the two proposals, EW = M and R = (M +m)/2
in both models, while EV and EV ∗ are derived in the Appendix. As the figure
7There are multiple equilibria. For example, in model B there is an equilibrium where
every voters casts 2 votes each period and the majority always wins. However, this equilibria
involves weakly dominated strategies.
8In fact, they remain unchanged for any absolute difference between the two groups, once
the threshold 3m < 2M has been passed. It is the threshold itself that depends on (M −m).
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shows, when the number of voters is small and the difference in size between
the two groups relatively important, the possibility of minority victories in the
storable votes mechanism is accompanied by some loss of efficiency in model B,
but not in model C, where efficiency is always at least as high as under simple
majority rule. The loss in model B is not large and disappears rapidly as the
number of voters and the relative size of the minority increases. For most sizes
of the electorate, storable votes allow voters to appropriate a larger share of the
total surplus in both models.9
4 Experimental design
4.1 Protocol
All sessions of the experiment were run either at the Hacker SSEL laboratory
at Caltech, the CASSEL laboratory at UCLA, or the PLESS laboratory at
Princeton with enrolled students who were recruited from the campus through
the laboratory web sites. No subject participated in more than one session.
All sessions focussed on the example described above: subjects voted on two
consecutive proposals (T = 2) and were allocated 2 bonus votes (B0 = 2), in
addition to the regular vote they were required to cast over each proposal. With
the exception of one session, committees were composed of 5 voters, divided into
two groups of 3 and 2 voters with systematically opposed preferences.10 The
experiment’s main treatment variable was the correlation of intensities within
each group - the distinction between model B and model C.
After entering the computer laboratory, the subjects were seated randomly in
booths separated by partitions and assigned ID numbers corresponding to their
computer terminal; when everyone was seated, the experimenter read aloud
the instructions, and any questions were answered publicly. The session then
began.11 Subjects were matched randomly into committees and within each
committee were assigned randomly to the majority or the minority group. Each
9The main difference between the two models emerges in the limit, and is not visible
in the figure. In model B, the valuation draws are independent, hence, as the population
becomes very large the law of large numbers guarantees that the empirical average intensity
of preferences in both groups converges to the mean of the F (v) distribution. This means that
random choice, simple majority voting and storable votes all converge to first best efficiency
and any efficiency-based argument for protecting the minority disappears. In model C, on the
other hand, the valuation draws within each group are perfectly correlated, and the law of large
numbers does not apply. As the number of voters increases, the difference in size between
the two groups becomes negligible and simple majority voting again converges to random
choice, but random choice remains inferior to efficient decision-making and to storable votes.
In very large populations, only minorities whose intensities are correlated should be protected
on efficiency grounds.
10As discussed below, we ran one session with committees of 9 voters, each divided into two
opposite groups of sizes 5 and 4.
11A sample of the instructions from one of the sessions is reproduced in the Ap-
pendix. We used the Multistage Game software package developed jointly between
the SSEL and CASSEL labs. This open-source software can be downloaded from
http://research.cassel.ucla.edu/software.htm
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subject was then shown his valuation for the first proposal and asked to choose
how many votes to cast in the first election. Valuations were restricted to
integer values and were drawn by the computer, with equal probability, from
the support [−100,−1] for majority members, and from [1, 100] for minority
members. In both treatments, the valuations were drawn independently for
majority and minority members.
In treatment B each member of each group was assigned a valuation drawn
independently from the specified support; in treatment C all members of the
same group in the same committee were assigned the same valuation (i.e. all
majority members in a given committee shared the same valuation, as did all
minority members in a committee). The independence of the valuations within
each group in treatment B and their perfect correlation in treatment C were
common knowledge. After everyone in a committee had voted, the computer
screen showed to each subject the number of votes cast by each of the two
groups in the subject’s committee, whether the proposal has passed or not, and
the subject’s own payoff from that election. Valuations over the second proposal
were then drawn, the remaining votes were automatically cast and the outcome
determined.
After the second proposal had been voted upon, subjects were rematched,
each was assigned a new budget of bonus votes, and the game was replayed.
Experimental sessions consisted of either 20 or 30 such rounds12, each round a
sequence of two consecutive proposals. In the rematching, minority members
always remained minority members and majority members always remained
majority members, but the composition of each group and of each committee
was randomly determined. Subjects were paid privately at the end of each
session their cumulative valuations for all proposals resolved in their preferred
direction, multiplied by a pre-determined exchange rate and complemented by a
fixed show-up payment of $10. Average earnings were about $17 per experiment
for minority subjects and about $31 for majority subjects.
4.2 Parameters
The only choice given to our experimental subjects was the number of votes to
cast over the first proposal. The equilibrium is described in the previous section
for generic M and m, and is reported below for the specific case M = 3, and
m = 2 (and for a robustness control in one experimental section, for M = 5,
andm = 4). Individual equilibrium strategies in treatment B and corresponding
equilibrium outcomes are in Table 1. The equilibrium cutpoints - the threshold
(absolute) values where individual voters switch from casting 0 to casting 1
bonus vote, and from casting 1 to casting 2 - are reported in row 2 of Table 1 and
are denoted c1 and c2.13 Rows 3 and 4 in the table report the expected frequency
of minority victories in equilibrium and under ex post efficiency, respectively.
Rows 5 and 6 report the expected share of per capita payoff for a minority voter,
12With the exception of one session of 15 rounds.
13Because the equilibrium cutpoints are identical for minority and majority voters, we use
the symbols c1 and c2 for both groups.
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relative to a majority voter, again in equilibrium and under ex post efficiency.
So, for example, in the {3, 2} experiment with storable votes a minority subject
the minority is expected to win on average 26% of what a majority subject
earns, if everybody plays the equilibrium strategy. Finally, the last two rows
report the expected share of normalized aggregate surplus appropriated with
storable votes (row 7) and with simple majority voting (row 8).14
Table 1: Equilibrium strategies and outcomes.
B Treatment
M , m 3, 2 5, 4
c1, c2 50, 50 50, 50
% min wins, sv 19 25
% min wins, eff 22.5 28.5
% (min/maj) payoff, sv 26 36
% (min/maj) payoff, eff 35.5 45
% surplus sv 71 61
% surplus nsv 75 62
The qualitative features of these numbers were discussed in the previous
section. Notice, once again, that although storable votes here are less efficient
from an aggregate point of view than simple majority voting, the efficiency loss
is minor, relative to the effect of storable votes on the welfare of minorities.
4.3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium strategies in treatment C pose a coordination problem. As de-
scribed in the previous section, if the two groups are of size {3, 2}, in equilibrium
the minority uses no bonus votes if its absolute valuation is smaller than 50,
and all its bonus votes if it is above; the majority casts a total of 5 votes if its
absolute valuation is smaller than 50, and 7 votes if it is larger than 50.15 Any
individual strategy compatible with these group strategies is an equilibrium.
Hence, each minority voter has a simple symmetrical strategy that aggregates
to the equilibrium group strategy: vote 1 if the valuation is below 50 and 3 if
14As remarked earlier, there is a second equilibrium where minority voters use weakly dom-
inated strategies: every subject always uses 1 bonus vote, and the majority always wins. We
found no evidence of this equilibrium in the data and do not discuss it further.
15When the two groups are of size {3, 2}, the majority has other equilibrium strategies,
but all are payoff-equivalent, and we treat them as identical when reporting the experimental
results. All equilibrium strategies satisfy: cast 0, 1, or 2 bonus votes with probabilities p0,
p1, p2 if the absolute valuation is smaller than 50, and 4, 5, or 6 bonus votes with probabilities
q0, q1, q2 if the absolute valuation is larger than 50, where p2 ≥ q2 and p1 = q1. The strategy
described in the text corresponds to p0 = p1 = 0, and q1 = q2 = 0.
The majority could equivalently cast 4 votes for valuations below 50, and 8 for valuations
above 50, with no effect on payoffs. Because the two strategies are payoff-equivalent, we treat
them as identical when reporting the experimental results.
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the valuation is 50 or above. But the aggregation problem for majority voters
is more difficult. The group strategy described above cannot be supported by
symmetric individual strategies, and coordination on asymmetric strategies is
hampered by the random rematching in our experimental design. In fact, for our
experimental environment, not only is there no symmetric individual strategy
that aggregates to the equilibrium group strategy, but there is no asymmetric
strategy that each majority voter can adopt consistently and that would always
aggregate to the equilibrium group strategy, for any possible rematching.
We know that a symmetrical equilibrium exists (by standard fixed point
arguments)16, but we have not been able to characterize it, and we doubt that
our experimental subjects, confronted with a new game and under time pressure,
could be much more successful. In practice, our basic C treatment is then a
test of the robustness of storable votes’ outcomes to coordination problems. To
evaluate the role of coordination more precisely, we designed two additional
treatments that replicate model C but where coordination problems are absent
by construction.
In treatment C2 (”correlated valuations, coordinated voting”) a single sub-
ject represented the whole group. Half of the experimental subjects were ran-
domly assigned to represent majority groups, and half minority groups. Each
majority group’s representative had 3 indivisible regular votes to cast on each
of the two proposals and 6 bonus votes to cast as desired. Each minority
group’s representative had 2 indivisible regular votes to spend on each of the
two proposals and 4 bonus votes. A committee was then formed by one pair
of experimental subjects, one subject randomly drawn from all those repre-
senting a minority group, and the other from all those representing a majority
group. In each committee, and for each proposal, valuations were drawn inde-
pendently with equal probability, from the support [−100,−1] for the majority
representative, and from [1, 100] for the minority one. The timing of the game
proceeded as described earlier. After each two-proposal round, partners were
rematched, but all minority representatives remained minority representatives
for the whole experimental session, as did all majority representatives. When
we discuss experimental payoffs from this treatment, we multiply the minority
representative’s payoff by 2 and the majority’s by 3, so as to make them com-
parable to the theoretical predictions and to the experimental payoffs for the C
case and to the following treatment, which we call CChat.
In treatment CChat (”correlated valuations, chat option”) we replicated the
C treatment, with each group composed of multiple individual subjects, adding
a ”chat option”. Before the vote on the first proposal, each group member is
allowed to send messages via computer to other members of his own group. Sub-
jects are instructed not to identify themselves, and the messages are anonymous
but otherwise unconstrained. In particular, they allow subjects to coordinate on
their preferred group strategy. Everything else in the experiment - the stochastic
properties of the valuation draws, the timing, the random re-matching - follows
exactly the C treatment.
16Taking into account that the set of types is finite in our experimental treatment.
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Equilibrium group strategies and expected outcomes are identical in the
three C treatments - C, C2, and CChat. They are reported in Table 2, where
gL and gH denote the cutpoints where both groups switch from casting 0 bonus
votes to casting 2, and from casting 2 to casting 4.17
Table 2: Equilibrium group strategies and outcomes.
C Treatments
M , m 3, 2
gL, gH 50, 50
% min wins, sv 25
% min wins, eff 33
% (min/maj) payoff, sv 38.5
% (min/maj) payoff, eff 52
% surplus sv 60
% surplus nsv 53
As discussed in the previous section, the outcome is more favorable to the
minority in model C than in model B, both in terms of the expected frequency
of minority victories and of its expected payoff, relative to the majority. Notice
also that storable votes outperform simple majority voting in terms of aggregate
efficiency.
The experimental design is summarized in Table 3. In all experiments the
majority was formed by 3 subjects and the minority by 2, with the exception of
session b3 where the number of subjects in each group was 5 and 4 respectively.
Session b3 serves us as a control on the sensitivity of the experimental results
to the size of the groups.
Table 3: Experimental Design
Session Groups size Subject pool # Subjects Rounds
b1 3,2 CIT 15 30
b2 3,2 UCLA 20 30
b3 5,4 UCLA 27 30
c1 3,2 UCLA 15 30
c2 3,2 PU 15 20
c3 3,2 PU 10 20
c21 3,2 CIT 12 30
c22 3,2 UCLA 16 30
c23 3,2 PU 12 20
cchat1 3,2 PU 10 20
cchat2 3,2 PU 15 15
17Again, we use the same symbols for both groups because the equilibrium cutpoints are
identical for the minority and the majority.
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5 Experimental Results
The experiments have two purposes. First, we want to verify the extent to
which the experimental outcome match the theoretical predictions: are minority
subjects able to win some of the votes, and are they able to do so without losing
too much aggregate efficiency, as the theory predicts? Second, focussing now
on subjects’ behavior, do their strategies replicate the theoretical equilibrium
strategies?
5.1 Outcomes and Efficiency
5.1.1 How often did the minority groups win?
The diagram on the left of Figure 2a summarizes the answer to this question.
The vertical axis is the percentage of times the minority prevailed in the exper-
imental sessions, and the horizontal axis is the percentages of times it would
have prevailed if all subjects had played the equilibrium strategy, given the val-
uations drawn during the experiments. Different treatments are indicated by
different symbols, as described in the figure’s legend.
Figure 2 here
The figure can then be read in several ways. The vertical height tells us that
the minority won between 20 and 25 percent of the time in C, C2, and CChat,
with little dispersion among them; it won less frequently in the B sessions
(around 15 percent of the time) with the exception of the one experiment of size
{5, 4}where the minority won about 23 percent of the time.
Clearly, storable votes help the minority win. The difference in this effect
across treatments matches the theoretical predictions, as is evident from the
way the points align along the 45-degree line. The closer to the line a point is,
the closer the experiment’s results are to the equilibrium predictions. If we esti-
mate a simple regression line, the hypotheses of a unitary slope parameter and
a zero constant term cannot be rejected at standard confidence values.18 On
average, the frequency of minority victories in the experiments differs from the
equilibrium predictions by 3 percentage points, without clear outliers and with-
out systematic treatment effects. We find this surprising because the complexity
of the individual equilibrium strategies in the basic C treatment (as opposed to
C2 and CChat) would suggest a larger discrepancy from equilibrium predictions
in that specific treatment, a discrepancy the data do not show.
5.1.2 Did the experimental payoff to the minority match the theo-
retical predictions?
The diagram on the right of figure 2a plots per capita minority payoff as per-
centage of per capita majority payoff in the experiments on the vertical axis,
18The estimated parameters are: 0.76 for the slope (standard error 0.23), and 3.4 for the
constant term (standard error 5.8).
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and in equilibrium on the horizontal axis, using the symbols of the previous
figure to identify the different experimental sessions. In all C, C2 and Cchat
treatments the relative minority payoff was higher than in any B treatments,
as predicted by the theory, ranging between 33 and 45 percent of the average
majority payoff, versus 16 to 20 percent in the B treatments of size {3, 2} and
30 percent in the B treatment of size {5, 4}. Again, the effect of the voting
mechanism in raising the minority’s payoff was significant. Out of eleven exper-
imental sessions, all but two are below the 45-degree line, suggesting that the
minority was unable to fully exploit the opportunity presented by the voting
mechanism. But the discrepancy is not large - the average distance from the
45-degree line is 5 percentage points, again without clear outliers19 or treatment
effects, which is small in comparison to the differences across treatments. Again,
if we estimate a regression line, we cannot reject the hypotheses of unitary slope
and zero constant.20
5.1.3 At what cost to the majority were the minority’s gains? At
what cost to overall efficiency?
The left-hand side of figure 2b plots the normalized total surplus in each session
on the vertical axis, against the equilibrium predictions on the horizontal axis.
The equilibrium predictions are calculated using the actual intensity values in
the experiment. Points on the 45 degree line indicate a perfect match to the
theory. The mean distance from the 45 degree line is only 7 percentage points,
again with little evidence of outliers, versus a mean equilibrium surplus share
of 60 percent. As in the previous figures, we cannot reject a regression line with
unitary slope and zero constant, although the fit is poorer.21
The central question is how the efficiency of storable votes compares to the
efficiency of alternative voting systems - in our case against simple majority
voting. In the diagram on the right of figure 2b, the vertical axis is again
the normalized total surplus in each session, now plotted against the equivalent
measure with simple majority voting calculated from the actual intensity values.
Theory predicts that data from C, C2 and CChat sessions should lie above the
45-degree line, while B data should lie below. The prediction is confirmed by
the C and by the B experiments. Surprisingly it is the ”easier” treatments with
coordination, C2 and Cchat, that fall short of the prediction. Once again, two
of the three most significant losses relative to non-storable votes occur in C2
sessions. Pooling all C, C2 and CChat data, the mean difference in normalized
surplus is +2 percentage points, compared to the theoretical prediction of +7.
Pooling all B data, the mean difference was approximately −10 percentage
points, compared with the theoretical prediction of −4.
19Note that a plausible range of values in Figure 2b is between 0 (the outcome with simple
majority voting) and 100 (the expected outcome with random decision-making). In figure 2a,
the corresponding range is between 0 and 50.
20The estimated parameters are: 1.03 for the slope (standard error 0.19), and −6.2 for the
constant term (standard error 7.1).
21The estimated parameters are: 0.7 for the slope (standard error 0.40), and 14.1 for the
constant term (standard error 24.1).
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The data from our experiment can be summarized in three main points.
First, storable votes help minorities substantially, both in terms of the frequency
with which minorities won decisions and in terms of the resulting benefits. Sec-
ond correlation of intensities works to the advantage of the minority. Third, the
efficiency costs associated with the increased representation of minority interests
were small in magnitude. Without correlation, storable votes induces (small)
aggregate welfare losses, but with perfectly correlated intensities, storable votes
produced welfare gains over simple majority voting.
5.2 Behavior
We begin by studying individual behavior in the treatments that did not al-
low group members to coordinate their strategies (B and C). We thus focus
naturally. Later we turn to group behavior and discuss the effects of explicit
coordination (treatments C2 and CChat).
5.2.1 Individual behavior
Storable votes allow voters to express intensity of preference by casting more
votes, at any given state, when they have stronger preferences. Hence, mono-
tonicity of voting strategies is at the core of the mechanism, and it is natural to
analyze subject behavior in our experiments by studying this property first.
To obtain a measure of monotonicity of individual behavior, we estimate
monotonicity violations and cutpoints for each subject. For each subject we
have K pairs of observations, where K equals either 20 or 30 depending on
the session22. Each pair consists of a first proposal intensity value and the
number of votes cast for (or against) the first proposal. The number of votes
cast is always 1, 2, or 3. A perfectly monotone strategy is one for which we
can find two cutpoints, c1 ≤ c2 such that whenever the subject’s first period
valuation was below c1 the subject cast 1 vote, whenever the subject’s first
period valuation was above c2, the subject cast 3 votes, and for intermediate
values between c1 and c2 the subject cast 2 votes. We calculate the number of
monotonicity violations as the minimum number of voting choices that would
have to be changed, for each subject, to make the strategy perfectly, monotonic.
We then identify the pair of cutpoints that is consistent with such monotonic
strategy. In some cases, multiple cutpoints are consistent with the same number
of monotonicity violations; when this happens, we select the pair that is closest
to the equilibrium cutpoints.
Figure 3a presents histograms of individual monotonicity violations in treat-
ments B and C. The horizontal axis is divided into deciles representing the
percentage of violations over the total number of voting decisions, and the ver-
tical axis reports the fraction of subjects that belong to each decile.
Figure 3 here
22With the exception of session cchat2, with 15 rounds.
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In the B treatment, 50 percent of the subjects have 3 or fewer violations out
of 30 voting decisions (10 percent). In the C treatment, 57 percent of subjects
had violation rates less than or equal to 10 percent. As comparison, a voter
choosing randomly whether to cast 0, 1, or 2 bonus votes would have a violation
rate converging to 67% as the number of decisions becomes very large.23 The
comparison makes clear that, although there is some noise, individual choices
indeed tend to be monotonic for most subjects.
The estimated cutpoints for all individual subjects in the B and C sessions
are displayed in figures 3b. Each point represents one subject’s estimated pair
of cutpoints, with c1 on the horizontal axis and c2 on the vertical axis. All
cutpoints lying on the 45 degree line involve no splitting of bonus votes: always
casting either both or neither of the bonus votes over the first decision. Moving
to the upper left corner of the graph are cutpoints that involve more and more
splitting of bonus votes, i.e. using one bonus vote in each period for a range
of values that increases as one approaches the corner. The upper left corner of
the graph, at (0, 100) corresponds to always casting one bonus vote. Cutpoints
for subjects in the minority group are in the left graph and cutpoints for the
subjects in the majority group are in the right graph. The rates of monotonicity
violations are indicated by shading the points, with the darkest points having
the fewest monotonicity violationst.
In the B treatments, the equilibrium cutpoints for both majority and minor-
ity subjects are (50, 50): if everyone played the equilibrium strategies all points
would be on the 45 degree line at 50. In the C treatments, (50, 50) remains an
equilibrium for individual minority subjects, but not for subjects in the major-
ity, whose asymmetrical strategies are contingent on the behavior of the other
members of the group and cannot be identified unambiguously in the figure.
Two features of the distribution of cutpoints appear in both treatments.
First, the minority cutpoints do cluster around (50, 50), and on average minority
subjects whose cutpoints are closer to equilibrium have lower violation rates.
Second, bonus votes are much more frequently split by majority voters, with
little difference between the two treatments in spite of the different theoretical
predictions. Intuitively, even in model B, majority voters have less to lose from
splitting their bonus votes - their larger number implies that they are guaranteed
to always win one of the two decisions, and one single vote more or less plays
a smaller role than in the case of the minority. Consider the parameter values
used in the experiments and a committee of size (3, 2). The expected loss to
a voter deviating from his equilibrium strategy and always casting one bonus
vote over each proposal is 15 percent in model B and 50 percent in model C for
a minority voter, versus 4 percent in model B and 8 percent in model C for a
majority voter (relative to the expected equilibrium payoff)24 The difference in
23To account for the smaller number of violations that would result from the small sample
and the free cutpoints, we simulated random behavior with 21 subjects and 30 rounds. We
found that no subjects had violation rates less or equal to 30 percent; 2 subjects were in the
fourth decile; 8 in the fifth, and 11 in the sixth.
24Supposing that all other voters play the equilibrium strategy. In model C, we consider
the case where the individual majority voter’s deviation causes the majority group strategy
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the cost of splitting one’s bonus votes in the two models may play some role in
the more pronounced clustering of the minority cutpoints around the 45 degree
line, and particularly around (50, 50) in the C treatment.
5.2.2 Group behavior
The monotonicity of the individual strategies provides only a partial picture.
Efficiency requires group strategies to be monotonic in the group value. In the
B treatment the notion of ”group value” is not clearly defined because different
subjects within a group have different values. But we can check for ”group
monotonicity” in the C treatment, that is, we can check whether the sum of the
votes by members of one group is monotone in their (common) value. If there is
heterogeneity in behavior, monotonicity at the individual level need not imply
monotonicity at the group level because individuals are continuously rematched.
The problem is particularly severe for the majority whose individual equilibrium
strategies are asymmetric.25
The histograms in the first row of Figure 4a illustrate the difficulty that
groups had in the C treatment. More than 40 percent of the groups had error
rates above 20 percent, compared to only 10 percent of individual subjects in
the same sessions (see Figure 3a). As expected, and as shown by the histogram
on the right, most errors are associated with the majority, where more than 60
percent of the groups had more than 20 percent error rates.
Figure 4 here
A comparison of these results to monotonicity violations in the C2 and
CChat treatments allows us to study the role of explicit coordination. According
to the histograms in the second row of Figure 4, the open communication in
CChat reduced group violations dramatically: all minority groups and 2 out of
5 of the majority groups had fewer than 10 percent violations. More surprising
is the poor performance of the C2 treatment, where perfect coordination is
imposed by the experimental design.26
These results leave us with a puzzle: if the aggregate group behavior of the
experimental subjects in sessions C often violates monotonicity, why did the
outcomes of these experiments - in terms of minority victories and efficiency -
still conform to the theory? Why did these sessions outperform, on average,
the C2 sessions with apparently comparable record of monotonicity violations.
The answer comes from the underlying monotonicity of the individual behav-
ior in treatment C. Intuitively, because individual subjects did cast their vote
monotonically, the violations resulting from the uncoordinated aggregation of
the votes are numerous, but not large: they tend to be concentrated around
to switch from casting either 5 or 7 votes to always casting 6.
25We identify a group by the label in the experiment (group 1, group 2, etc.), but rematching
implies that the composition of each group continues to change. Note that if equilibrium
strategies were symmetrical, the changing composition of the group would not matter.
26This appears to be the result of a single experimental session: session c22 conducted at
UCLA (where 25 percent of the subjects had a rate of violations approaching 50 percent).
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the cutpoints values. To verify this, the histograms in figure 4b summarize the
distribution of the average distance of ”mistaken” (i.e. non-monotonic) vot-
ing choices from the cutpoints, as percentage of the expected distance if voting
choices were random.27 The CChat experiments show the greatest consistency:
with one exceptional outlier, all groups have error distances below 20 percent
of the random case. But it is the comparison between the C and the C2 treat-
ments that is particularly revealing in explaining the differences in experimental
outcomes: one-fourth of all C2 groups have error distances that are closer to
the purely random case than any of the C groups. As mentioned, this reflects
mostly one outlier session, c22, and how much of an outlier c22 is is made clear
in the diagram on the right, in the bottom row of figure 4b. Almost half of all
groups in this session have error distances that are closer to the purely random
case than any of the C groups, and less than one fifth have distances that are
less than 10 percent of the random case, a very different result from the other
two C2 sessions. This explains why the aggregate experimental payoff of session
c22 falls short both of the theoretical prediction and of the payoff with simple
majority. As shown in figure 2b, these few cases were sufficient to exact a cost in
terms of efficiency, lowering the overall performance of the C2 treatment. Why
the treatment proved difficult to our subjects is an open question, although we
can speculate that the problem may come from the larger size of the individual
strategy space: each minority voter had 5 different choices of how many votes
(2, 3, 4, 5, 6) to use in the first period, and each majority voter had 7 different
choices (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9).
As in the analysis of individual behavior, the monotonicity analysis generates
cutpoints estimates.28 Group cutpoints are depicted in Figure 5, with minority
cutpoints on the left and majority cutpoints on the right. In line with the
equilibrium predictions, we can summarize the strategies of each group through
two cutpoints, represented by a point in the diagrams and equal to (50, 50) for
both the minority and the majority.29
Figure 5 here
The first row of diagrams in Figure 5 refers to C treatments; the second
row to C2 and the last to CChat. As in Figure 3b, darker points indicate
27Following this logic, these cutpoints are estimated so as to minimize the average distance
(both in the experimental data and in the theoretical random case). With a very large number
of random voting choices, the two cutpoints that minimize the expected errors’ distance are
(50, 50). The frequency of error is 2/3, with an average distance of 25, yielding an expected
distance of 50/3. The corresponding number in the experimental data is, for a given pair
of cutpoints, the sum of all errors’ distances, divided by K, the number of rounds in the
experiment.
28The cutpoints estimates that minimize the number of monotonicity violations need not be
identical to those that minimize the errors’ distance. In practice, they differ mostly in the case
of those subjects with more random behavior. The substance of the results does not change,
and we report here the cutpoints the minimize the number of violations, for consistency with
the discussion of individual behavior.
29For the majority groups, we treat as identical all payoff-equivalent strategies, i.e. voting
either 3, or 4, or 5 below gl, and voting either 7, or 8, or 9 above gh.
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fewer monotonicity violations. Coordination affects the cutpoints of the minor-
ity groups: none of the estimated cutpoints in treatments C2 and CChat lies
outside the 45 degree line, as opposed to what we observe in treatment C. Thus
in treatments C2 and CChat, in accordance with equilibrium the behavior of
all minority groups is best described as voting either 2 (at lower values) or 6 (at
higher values), with some dispersion around the equilibrium cutpoints (50, 50).
The majority’s behavior, on the other hand, is best described as splitting the
bonus votes for some intermediate range of values. In addition, the light shad-
ing of most points in the majority figures reflects the relatively large number
of monotonicity violations for any estimate of cutpoints. The relatively greater
deviation from equilibrium by the majority groups may reflect their relative
low cost of such deviations. With a single coordinated strategy, the expected
percentage loss to the majority from always splitting the bonus votes is about 8
percent when the minority plays the equilibrium strategy.30 For the minority, on
the other hand, splitting the bonus votes can be very costly: a minority always
casting 4 votes always loses against a majority casting 5 votes at valuations
below 50 and 7 at valuations above 50.
6 Conclusions and Discussion
We draw three main conclusions from the experiment. First, our results con-
firm the importance of monotonic voting behavior in realizing the potential
efficiency of storable votes. As in previous experiments in symmetrical envi-
ronments (Casella, Gelman and Palfrey, forthcoming), it is this more intuitive
requirement, relative to the full discipline of equilibrium behavior, that keeps
the experimental outcomes in line with the theoretical predictions. Second, the
results on group behavior in treatment C allow us to propose a stronger conjec-
ture: for the most part, the efficiency of the mechanism is preserved even in the
presence of ”some” violations of monotonicity, as long as these violations are
not large. What matters is that on average more votes are cast at higher values.
When this requirement is not satisfied, as in the outlier session c22 in treatment
C2, the efficiency loss is clear. Third, deviations from equilibrium are partic-
ularly costly to the minority, whose payoff, relative to the majority, falls short
of the equilibrium prediction in all but two sessions (figure 2a). The advantage
of coordination in inducing the minority towards the equilibrium strategy has a
counterpart in figure 2a, where CChat and C2 treatments almost always have
smaller deviations from the theoretical predictions than treatments B and C.
Majoritarian principles are a fundamental ingredient of democratic institu-
tions. But they carry with them the risk of disenfranchising minority groups
and endangering the stability of the system, by violating principles of both eq-
uity and efficiency. In a well-designed democracy, a judicial system protecting
the rights of minority groups needs to be supplemented by political remedies
30In fact, in this model the majority’s maximin strategy entails splitting the bonus votes.
It corresponds to cutpoints (25, 100): cast no bonus votes for values below 25, but split the
bonus votes for all values above 25.
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that ensure the minority a voice through the daily, ordered exercise of politi-
cal rights. This paper has analyzed the potential of a simple voting system -
storable votes - to fulfill this function. By granting voters a stock of votes to be
divided as desired over a series of multiple binary decisions, storable votes allow
the minority to cumulate votes on specific issues and to win sometime. Because
the minority wins only if its strength of preferences is high, and the majority’s
is low, the gains in terms of equity have little if any cost in terms of efficiency.
We have studied two related models where two groups of different size have
consistently opposite preferences. In our ”correlated” model, C, all members
of a group - whether the majority or the minority - agree not only on on the
direction of their preferences but also on the strength of their preferences. If we
think in terms of political parties, these would be parties with strong discipline;
more generally, the model is best suited to represent groups with some level of
organization, sufficient to agree on the set of priorities. In our ”basic” model,
model B, on the other hand, all members of a group agree on the direction of
their preferences, and the two groups have opposite preferences, but within a
group the members’ priorities may differ. The groups are not organized.
Although storable votes help in minority in both models, both the theory
and the experiments support the intuition that the minority fares better when
its members agree on priorities. The voting system is decentralized and coor-
dination can be a problem even when preferences are perfectly correlated - and
the minority does better in the experimental treatments with more coordination
- but the larger effect comes from the agreement on priorities. The minority
can only win if a sufficient number of its members all vote heavily on a given
issue. Agreeing on priorities is a very useful first step in achieving that goal.
The literature on cumulative voting had conjectured a similar effect: Guinier
(1994) states that cumulative voting favors well-organized minorities, and in
fact considers only well-organized minorities as deserving of special protection.
For both models, our experimental results confirm the theoretical predic-
tions on voting outcomes: the frequency of minority victories, the payoff to
the minority relative to the majority, the aggregate payoff to all voters and the
comparison to the aggregate payoff under simple majority. They do not match
the theory in terms of behavior: especially among majority voters, we observe
equilibrium strategies only rarely. However, the monotonicity of voting strate-
gies - more votes are cast when the strength of preferences is higher - is almost
always respected. Where it cannot be by design (in the aggregate majority
group vote of treatment C), monotonicity still characterizes individual voting
choices, with the result that deviations at the aggregate level, though not in-
frequent, are not large. The efficiency costs from these deviation appear small.
These findings reinforce most of our tentative conclusions from an earlier set of
storable votes experiments with identical voters (Casella, Gelman and Palfrey,
in press), suggesting robustness to asymmetric environments.
There are many directions for further research. We limit ourselves to men-
tioning two. First, it would be interesting to compare storable votes to a larger
set of alternative mechanisms, both theoretically and experimentally. These al-
ternative mechanisms should include vetoes, serial dictatorship and potentially
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first-best mechanisms a la Jackson and Sonnenschein (forthcoming). Storable
votes are more flexible but more complicated than vetoes, and less flexible and
less complicated than the Jackson and Sonnenschein mechanism. Serial dictator-
ship requires a secondary mechanism to allocate decisions to specific individuals
or groups in a somewhat efficient fashion. What can the theory tell us, and how
would all compare experimentally?31 Second, the sensitivity of storable votes to
agenda manipulation is an open question. The agenda setting procedure should
be part of the overall game, and voters will decide how many votes to cast
knowing how new issues are brought to a vote. A priori it is not clear whether
problems will arise: having multiple votes that can be shifted across proposals
may make the order of the proposals more important, but also increase the
ability to resist possible manipulations of this order. The additional consider-
ation of political minorities may exacerbate possible problems, either because
majority losses are particularly expensive in terms of efficiency or because the
minority may end up unable to ever control any outcome.
31Two recent experimental analyses are Engelmann and Grimm (2006) on the Jackson
Sonnenschein mechanism, and Kagel et al. (2005) on veto power. Neither paper compares
different mechanisms.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that x∗Mt(vi, Bt, t) and x
∗
mt(vi, Bt, t) exist.
Consider candidate equilibrium strategies {x′it(vi, Bt, t)} for model C , where∑
i∈m x
′
it(vi, B, t) = x
∗
mt(vi, B, t) and
∑
i∈M x
′
it(vi, B, t) = x
∗
Mt(vi, B, t). Be-
cause preferences between the two groups are always opposed, at any state only
the aggregate voting choice of the opposite group affects voters’ payoffs. In
addition, because in model C preferences within each group are always per-
fectly correlated, by definition {x′it(vi, B, t)}, i ∈ m maximize the expected pay-
off of each individual minority member, given x∗Mt(vi, B, t) (and similarly for
{x′it(vi, B, t)}, i ∈ M , given x∗mt(vi, B, t)). It follows that no individual devia-
tion from the prescribed strategies can be profitable and {x′it(vi, Bt, t)} must be
equilibrium strategies. Note that in general the equilibrium will not be unique:
any permutation of individual strategies that leaves the aggregate vote for the
group unchanged, at given state, is an equilibrium. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) Existence of equilibrium in pure strategies. Mil-
grom and Weber (1985) discuss conditions for existence of an equilibrium in
distributional strategies. In particular, conditional on a publicly observed vari-
able, individual types are required to be independent. The publicly observed
information in our case is each voter’s membership in one of the two groups,
and hence the support of the distribution from which valuations are drawn.
Conditional on such support, individual valuations are independent in case B.
The arguments in Casella (2005), showing that the game satisfies all conditions
required by Milgrom and Weber remain applicable here. Hence an equilibrium
in pure strategies exists for model B. Conditional on public information on the
support of each distribution, valuations are independent in the two-voter version
of model C. Again, the arguments in Casella (2005) apply, and an equilibrium
in pure strategies exists. But since such an equilibrium must be an equilibrium
of the n-voter C game, it follows that an equilibrium in pure strategies of the
n-voter C game exists. (ii) Monotonicity of the equilibrium strategies. Call a
strategy monotonic if, at a given state, the number of votes cast is monoton-
ically increasing in the intensity of preferences vit. The argument in Casella,
Gelman and Palfrey (forthcoming) shows that at any given state all individual
best response strategies must be monotonic when members of each group do not
play correlated strategies. Thus the argument applies immediately to equilibria
of model B. It also applies to the two-voter version of model C, and hence to
group strategies, as opposed to individual strategies, in the equilibrium we focus
on in the n-voter C game. If, at any given state, all best response strategies
must be monotonic and an equilibrium exists, it follows that equilibrium strate-
gies must be monotonic. Because there is a continuum of types and a finite set
of strategies, then it must be that monotonic equilibrium strategies must take
the form of monotone cutpoint strategies. ¤
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider any candidate equilibrium where the mi-
nority is expected to lose with probability 1 over each decision. A minority
member cannot be worse off by cumulating all his bonus votes on one decision.
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Over all decisions, there must be at least one where with positive probability
the majority casts no more than MB0/T bonus votes, and since the minority
can never cast fewer than m total votes, a deviating minority member can al-
ways find a decision where with positive probability the difference in votes cast
is at most M(1 + B0/T ) −m. Thus with positive probability the outcome of
that decision changes and deviation is profitable if M(1 + B0/T ) ≤ m + B0,
or B0(1 −M/T ) ≥ M −m. This condition requires T > M , and in this case
becomes B0 ≥ T (M −m)/(T −M). Note that the condition is sufficient and
applies to both models B and C. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider the following strategy for each voter on
either side: cast only the regular vote over the first T−2 decisions; at T−1, cast
all bonus votes if vi > α (i ∈ {m,M}), for a fixed α > 0, and none otherwise;
cast all remaining votes in the last election. We show in step (i) that if m > 2
then there exists a B0 for which such strategies are equilibrium strategies. We
then show in (ii) that in such an equilibrium EV0 > EW0 if m > M/2.
(i). Suppose all other voters are following such a strategy. In the first T − 2
periods, m + B0 < M (or B0 < M −m) is sufficient to rule out deviation by
a minority voter, because he can cast at most all his bonus votes. In period
T −1, B0 < M−m is again sufficient to rule out deviation by a minority voter if
vm < α, because the voter can hope to overturn the decision in minority’s favor
only if the majority is not using its bonus votes. But note that the condition
is also sufficient to rule out deviation when vm > α because in such a case a
minority voter can be tempted to withdraw some or all of his bonus votes only if
by doing so he can overturn a T -period decision against the minority, or, again,
only if m + B0 < M . Majority voters always win the first T − 2 decisions. At
T − 1, if vM < α, a majority member can be tempted to cast some or all of his
bonus votes only if by doing so he can turn in majority’s favor a decision that
would otherwise be won by the minority. Thus a sufficient condition ruling out
such a deviation is: M +B0 < m(1+B0), or B0 > (M −m)/(m− 1). As in the
case of the minority, the condition is also sufficient to rule out deviation when
vM > α. Thus for all m > 2, there exists B0 ∈ ((M − m)/(m − 1),M − m)
such that the strategies are equilibrium strategies for all voters. Note that
M + B0 < m(1 + B0) implies M < m(1 + B0): the minority wins at T − 1 if
(vmT−1 > α, vMT−1 < α), and wins at T if (vmT−1 < α, vMT−1 > α). The
majority wins at all other times.
(ii). When all voters follow these strategies, EV0 > EW0 iff:
27
F (α)
[
M
∫ α
0
vdF (v) + F (α)M
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)
]
+
+[1− F (α)]
[
M
∫ 1
α
vdF (v) + [1− F (α)]M
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)
]
+
+F (α)
[
M
∫ 1
α
vdF (v) + [1− F (α)]m
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)
]
+
+F (α)
[
m
∫ 1
α
vdF (v) + [1− F (α)]M
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)
]
> 2M
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)
Simplifying:
F (α) [MF (α) +m(1− F (α))]
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)+ (A1)
+[mF (α) +M(1− F (α))]
∫ 1
α
vdF (v) > M
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)
Note that the left-hand side simplifies to M
∫ 1
0
vdF (v) when evaluated at either
α = 0 or α = 1, since in both cases the majority always wins (and thus EV0 =
EW0). Taking the derivative of (A1) with respect to α and evaluating it at
α = 0, we obtain:
∂(EV0 − EW0)
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=0
= f(0)
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)(2m−M) > 0⇔ m > M/2
Thus if m > M/2 there exists a threshold α > 0 such that the strategies
described above lead to higher ex ante welfare than simple majority voting. ¤
Example. Model B.
(A) Equilibrium. To verify that the strategy described is an equilibrium,
consider the best response for voter i. If i casts xi1 votes in the vote over
the first proposal, his expected utility over the whole game is: EUi|xi1 =
vi1prob(W1|xi1) + E(v)prob(W2|4 − xi1) where prob(Wt|xit) is i’s probability
of obtaining the desired outcome in period t conditional on casting xit votes,
and E(v) = 0.5. Since (n− 1) is an even number, and every other voter is cast-
ing either 1 or 3 votes, the difference in votes between the two sides, excluding
i, must be even for both proposals. Thus, when i considers the choice between
casting 3, 2 or 1 votes, the only case in which the choice matters is a difference
of 2 votes in his side disfavor, either over proposal 1 or proposal 2:
EUi|3 > EUi|2⇔ vi1[prob(∆x1−i = 2)] > 0.5[prob(∆x2−i = 2)]
EUi|2 > EUi|1⇔ vi1[prob(∆x1−i = 2)] > 0.5[prob(∆x2−i = 2)]
(where ∆x1−i indicates the number of votes by which i’s side is losing, absent i’s
vote). Given the symmetry of F (v), in the candidate equilibrium the probability
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of any other voter casting 1 or 3 votes is identical, implying: prob(∆x1−i = 2) =
prob(∆x2−i = 2). Thus i’s best response is to cast 1 vote if vi1 < 0.5 and 3
votes if vi1 > 0.5; the conclusion holds for all i, and the strategy is indeed an
equilibrium. If M > 3m, prob(∆x1−i = 2) = prob(∆x2−i = 2) = 0 , and the
number of votes cast is irrelevant.
(B) Frequency of minority victories. Write the majority size as M = m +
2k − 1, with k ≥ 1 (recall than n is odd). The minority wins the first vote
if there are at least k more valuations above 0.5 among the minority than the
majority. Given the symmetry of the Uniform, the probability of this event is
given by the formula in the text. The minority wins the second vote if there are
at least k more valuations below 0.5 over the first proposal among the minority
than the majority, an event that again, given the symmetry of the Uniform
distribution, has the probability given in the text. Note that k must be smaller
than m, implying that the majority always wins if M ≥ 3m.
(C) Efficient frequency of minority victories. According to our efficiency cri-
terion, the minority should win whenever the sum of its valuations is larger than
the sum of the majority’s valuations. Call y (z) the sum of m (M) independent
random variables, each distributed Uniformly over [0, 1]. The efficient frequency
of minority victories is then given by
∫m
0
(∫m
z
Pm(y)dy
)
PM (z)dz where:
Pm(y) =
1
2(m− 1)!
m∑
s=0
(−1)s
(
m
s
)
(y − s)m−1sign(y − s) (A2)
(and correspondingly for PM (z)).
(D) Expected payoff. (i) Equilibrium. With n odd and the equilibrium
strategies described above, the difference in votes cast by the two groups is
always an even number. In addition, the symmetry of the Uniform distribution
guarantees that the probability of any given difference in votes is equal over the
two proposals. If we call prob(WM |x) the probability of obtaining the desired
outcome for i ∈ M , conditional on casting x votes, we can write the ex ante
expected payoff of a majority member as:
EVBi = (3/8)prob(WM |1) + (5/8)prob(WM |3) ∀i ∈M
where prob(WM |1) = prob(xM−i ≥ xm) and prob(WM |3) = prob(xM−i ≥ xm −
2). Recall thatM = m+2k−1. Given the equilibrium strategies, the symmetry
of the Uniform distribution, and the independence of the valuation draws, if we
call ”high” a valuation above 0.5, prob(xM−i ≥ xm) equals the probability that
the number of high draws in the minority group is at most k − 1 higher than
for the majority group, excluding voter i:
prob(WM |1) = 1−
m∑
s=k
[
m−s∑
r=0
(
M − 1
r
)(
m
r + s
)]
2−(M−1+m)
Similarly, prob(xM−i ≥ xm − 2) equals the probability that the number of high
draws in the minority group is at most k higher than for the majority group,
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excluding voter i:
prob(WM |3) = 1−
m∑
s=k+1
[
m−s∑
r=0
(
M − 1
r
)(
m
r + s
)]
2−(M−1+m)
Analogous calculations yield the ex ante expected payoff of a minority mem-
ber:
EVBj = (3/8)prob(Wm|1) + (5/8)prob(Wm|3) ∀j ∈ m
where:
prob(Wm|1) =
m−1∑
s=k
[
m−s−1∑
r=0
(
M
r
)(
m− 1
r + s
)]
2−(M+m−1)
and
prob(Wm|3) =
m−1∑
s=k−1
[
m−s−1∑
r=0
(
M
r
)(
m− 1
r + s
)]
2−(M+m−1)
Having derived the ex ante expected payoff of a majority and a minority member,
respectively - payoffs that are reported in Figure 2 - we can write the ex ante
aggregate expected payoff in equilibrium as EVB = M(EVBi) +m(EVBj), i ∈
M , j ∈ m.
(ii) First best efficiency. For each proposal, the ex ante efficient aggregate
payoff EU∗B is easily derived, given (A2):
EU∗B =
∫ m
0
(∫ m
z
yPm(y)dy
)
PM (z)dz +
∫ m
0
(∫ M
y
zPM (z)dz
)
Pm(y)dy
(A3)
Over the two proposals, the ex ante efficient payoff is 2EU∗B . The first term
in (A3) corresponds to the efficient expected payoff for the minority group,
and the second for the majority group. The corresponding per capita values
(multiplied by 2) are plotted in Figure 1b. (iii) Simple majority voting. With
simple majority voting, the majority always wins. Its expected payoff equals
the aggregate expected payoff and is given by:
∫M
0
zPM (z)dz =M/2 or M over
the 2 proposals. (iv) Random choice. If each group has a fifty percent chance of
winning any vote, the aggregate expected payoff is 1/2(M/2) + 1/2(m/2) over
each proposal, or (M +m)/2 for the 2-proposal game.
Example. Model C.
(A) Equilibrium. The majority can ensure itself victory over all proposals
if 2M > 3m. Suppose then 2M ≤ 3m. When xm = m, the minority always
loses (m < max{M,m + 3} < min{3M, 4M − (m + 3)}). The only possible
deviation for a minority member is to cast 2 or 3 votes when xm−i = m − 1,
but m+ 2 < max{M,m+ 3} < min{3M, 4M − (m+ 3)}: the deviation cannot
be profitable. The majority always wins when casting min{3M, 4M − (m+ 3)}
votes, but loses when xM = max{M,m + 3} if xm = 3m. A majority member
could deviate and use his bonus votes when xM−i = max{M − 1,m+ 2}. But
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casting 2 votes cannot be profitable: with 2M ≤ 3m, max{M +1,m+4} < 3m.
And neither can casting 3: with 2M ≤ 3m, either max{M+2,m+5} < 3m and
min{3M − 2, 4M − (m+ 5)} > 3m, in which case the outcomes are unchanged;
or max{M + 2,m+ 5} > 3m and min{3M − 2, 4M − (m+ 5)} < 3m, in which
case the certainty of winning at vM > 0.5 is traded for the certainty of winning
in the future, with E(v) = 0.5 - a net loss in expected utility.
(B) Frequency of minority victories. If 2M ≤ 3m the minority wins the first
vote if (vm1 > 0.5∩ vM1 < 0.5) and the second if (vm1 < 0.5∩ vM1 > 0.5) - given
the symmetry of the Uniform distribution, it wins each vote with probability
0.25.
(C) Efficient frequency of minority victories. Given the perfect correlation
of valuations within each group, the efficient frequency of minority victories is
given by prob(MvM < mvm) =
∫ 1
0
∫ (m/M)vm
0
dvMdvm = m/(2M).
(D) Expected payoff. (i) Equilibrium. If 2M > 3m, the majority always wins
and the expected aggregate payoff over the two proposals equals M . If 2M ≤
3m, the expected aggregate payoff equals: (1/4)(M/4 +M/2) + (1/4)(3M/4 +
M/2) + (1/4)(3M/4 + m/2) + (1/4)(3m/4 +M/2) = (13M + 5m)/16 (where
the first term is the expected payoff over the two proposals when (vm1 < 0.5∩
vM1 < 0.5), the second when (vm1 > 0.5∩ vM1 > 0.5), the third when (vM1 >
0.5∩ vm1 < 0.5), and the fourth when (vm1 > 0.5∩ vM1 < 0.5) - all events
with probability 1/4). (ii) First best efficiency. In model C we can represent
the total valuation of the minority (majority) group by a random variable y
(z), Uniformly distributed over [0,m] ([0,M ]). The efficient aggregate expected
payoff, per proposal, is given by:
EU∗C =
∫ m
0
(∫ m
z
y
m
dy
)
1
M
dx+
∫ m
0
(∫ M
y
z
M
dz
)
1
m
dy =
m2 + 3M2
6M
(A4)
Over the two proposals, the ex ante efficient payoff is 2EU∗C . The first term
in (A4) corresponds to the efficient expected payoff for the minority group
(m2/(3M)), and the second for the majority group ((3M2 − m2)/6M). The
corresponding per capita values (multiplied by 2) are plotted in Figure 1b. (iii)
Simple majority voting. With simple majority voting, the majority always wins,
and its expected payoff, which equals the aggregate expected payoff, is given by:∫M
0
z
M dz =M/2 or M over the 2 proposals. (iv) Random choice. If each group
has a fifty percent chance of winning any vote, the aggregate expected payoff
is 1/2(M/2) + 1/2(m/2) over each proposal, or (M +m)/2 for the 2-proposal
game.
31
SAMPLE INSTRUCTIONS (CChat1)
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this decision making experiment,
and for arriving on time. During the experiment we require your complete,
undistracted attention, and ask that you follow instructions carefully. You may
not open other applications on your computer, chat with other students, or
engage in other distracting activities, such as using your phone, reading books,
etc.
You will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment.
Different participants may earn different amounts. What you earn depends
partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and
all interaction between you will take place through the computers. It is impor-
tant that you not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants
during the experiments.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction
period, you will be given a complete description of the experiment and will
be shown how to use the computers. If you have any questions during the
instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be answered out loud
so everyone can hear. If you have any questions after the experiment has begun,
raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you.
The experiment you are participating in is a voting experiment, where you
will be asked to allocate a budget of several votes over two different proposals.
We will begin with a practice session. The practice session will be followed
by the paid session, which will consist of 20 matches. Each match will have
elections for two different proposals, and you will receive a new budget of votes
at the beginning of each match.
At the end of the paid session, you will be paid the sum of what you have
earned, plus a show-up fee of $10.00. Everyone will be paid in private and you
are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned. Your earnings
during the experiment are denominated in FRANCS. Your DOLLAR earnings
are determined by multiplying your earnings in FRANCS by a conversion rate.
For this experiment the conversion rate is 0.01, meaning that 100 FRANCS
equal 1 DOLLAR.
DESCRIPTION
At the beginning of the first match, you will be randomly assigned with 4
other persons in the room to form a 5-voter committee, which votes over two
different proposals, in sequence. Of the 5 voters of this committee, 2 voters
belong to the FOR group; the remaining 3 voters belong to the AGAINST
group. Whether you belong to the FOR or to the AGAINST group is decided
randomly by the computer and will be displayed on your computer monitor.
The groups not only differ in size, but also differ in their preference over
proposals. Specifically, all voters in the FOR group are always in favor of all
proposals; all voters in the AGAINST group are always against all proposals.
Each voter is given one “regular” vote to cast in each of the two proposal
elections. You must always use this vote in each proposal election. In addition,
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each voter is given a total of 2 “bonus votes” at the beginning of each match
that you will use in addition to the regular votes.
The first proposal your committee votes on is called Proposal A. You may
cast up to 3 votes in the A election (your regular A vote plus either 0, 1, or
2 of your bonus votes.) Before proceeding to the vote, you are assigned your
personal Proposal A value. If your value is positive, you are in favor of Proposal
A; if your value is negative, you are against Proposal A. Each voter of the FOR
group is in favor of Proposal A and has a positive value for Proposal A which
is equally likely to be any amount between 1 and 100 francs. Every member of
the FOR group is assigned the SAME Proposal A value by the computer. Each
voter of the AGAINST group is against Proposal A and has a negative value
for Proposal A which is equally likely to be any amount between -1 and -100
francs. Every member of the AGAINST group is assigned the same Proposal A
value by the computer.
If you are in the FOR group, you earn your value if A passes. If you are
in the AGAINST group, you earn the absolute value of your value if A does
not pass. For example, if your are in the AGAINST group and your proposal
A value is –55, then you earn 55 francs if A does not pass, and 0 francs if A
passes. A passes if there are more YES votes than NO votes in the A election.
A does not pass if there are more NO votes than YES votes. Ties are broken
randomly. In this example, you also know that the other two members of the
AGAINST group also have Proposal A values of –55.
After being told your proposal A value, you will be allowed two minutes to
exchange messages with the other members of your group. The messages you
send and receive are not seen by members of the other group. They are private
messages within your group. The messages must conform to the following rules.
1. Your messages must be relevant to the experiment. Do not engage in social
chat. 2. You are not permitted to send messages that are intended to reveal
your identity or participant ID number. 3. The use of threatening or offensive
language, including profanity, is not permitted.
At any time during this 2 minute period, you can make your individual
voting decision. You must decide whether to cast 1 vote, 2 votes, or 3 votes in
the proposal A election. If you are in the FOR group, any votes you cast will be
automatically counted as YES votes for A. If you are in the AGAINST group,
any votes you cast will be automatically counted as NO votes.
The experimenter will announce when the two minute period is finished. If
you haven’t yet voted, please vote when the announcement is made, so we can
all proceed to the next proposal. You are not told how the other people have
voted until after you cast your vote, although you are free to say whatever you
wish about your voting decision to the other members of your group during the
two minute message stage.
Whatever bonus votes you do not use in the A election, will be saved for
you to use in the proposal B election. For example, if you cast 1 vote in the
A election, all your bonus votes will be saved for the B election. If you cast 2
votes in the A election, only 1 of your bonus votes will be saved, and if you cast
3 votes in the A election, none of your bonus votes are saved.
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After you and the other voters in your committee have made voting decisions,
you are told the outcome of the proposal A election, and the total number of
votes FOR and AGAINST. You then proceed to the proposal B election. You are
in the same committee for the proposal B election as you were for the proposal
A election. In addition, if you were in the FOR group in the A election, you
remain in the FOR group in the B election (and if you were in the AGAINST
group, you remain in the AGAINST group).
There is no message stage for Proposal B. When you and the voters in your
committee are ready to proceed, you will each be assigned proposal B values
in the same manner that your proposal A values were assigned. Each voter’s
assigned value for proposal B will typically be different than their proposal A
values. All voters in the FOR group still receive positive values, and these values
are the same for all members of the FOR group. All voters in the AGAINST
group receive negative values, and these values are the same for all members of
the AGAINST group. All your remaining votes will automatically be cast as
YES votes for proposal B if you are a FOR voter, and as NO votes if you are
an AGAINST voter. The outcome of the B election is then reported to you.
When everyone has finished this completes the first match, and we will then
go to the next match. You will be rematched with 4 other people to form a new
5-person committee, and repeat the procedure described above. The voters in
your new committee will be selected randomly by the computer, but if you were
a FOR voter in the first committee, you will still be a FOR voter for the rest
of the experiment. And if you were an AGAINST voter in the first match, you
will still be in the AGAINST group for the rest of the experiment. As in the
first match, your new committee has 2 FOR voters and 3 AGAINST voters.
After your new committee has finished voting on both proposals in the second
match, you will again be rematched into a new committee in a similar way, and
this will continue for 30 matches. Remember that each match consists of 2
proposals, every committee has 2 FOR voters and 3 AGAINST voters. Also
remember, if you are a FOR voter, you will always be a FOR voter, and if you
are an AGAINST voter, you will always be an AGAINST voter.
PRACTICE SESSION
We will now give you a chance to get used to the computers with a brief
practice session. Are there any questions before we begin the practice match?
[ANSWER QUESTIONS]
You will not be paid for this practice session; it is just to allow you to get
familiar with the experiment and your computers. During the practice session,
do not press any keys or click with your mouse, unless instructed to. When we
instruct you, please do exactly as we ask. We will now hand out record sheets
for you to record important information during the experiment. Please raise
your hand if you need a pen or pencil.
HAND OUT RECORD SHEETS AND PENS AND COLLECT YELLOW
CARDS
Please pull out your dividers so we can begin the practice session.
[START GAME on SERVER]
FIRST PPT SLIDE
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This is the decision screen for Proposal A in match 1. Your ID# is printed
at the very top left of your screen. Please record this on your record sheet.
The screen tells you your proposal A value, whether you are in the FOR
group or in the AGAINST group, and the number of people in each group
(always 2 for the FOR group and 3 for the AGAINST group in this experiment).
Then the screen tells you the number of votes you have available. The bottom
window of your screen is the history table, which is blank now because nothing
has happened yet.
Please record your proposal A value on your record sheet in the row labeled
“Practice 1 A”. Rememer that everyone in your group has the same value as
you do. That is, everyone in the FOR group of your committee has the same
positive proposal A value in this round, and everyone in the AGAINST group
of your committee has the same negative proposal A value this round. For
example, if you are in the FOR group and your proposal A value is 41, then
this tells you that both of the other members of your committee’s FOR group
in your committee also have a proposal A value equal to 41. The AGAINST
group members of your committee also share a proposal A value, but all you
would know is that it is some negative number between -1 and -100.
It is important that you understand how these values are assigned. Are there
any questions before we proceed with the practice round?
After recording this information, we begin the 2 minute message stage. Mes-
sages are entered by typing on the line at the very bottom of the screen and
then clicking the send button. Everyone please practice this once by sending
the message “Hello” now. Notice that this is echoed in the message display box,
and your message is also displayed on your screen. Also notice that each of
your have been assigned a temporary number that identifies you anonymously
to the other members of your group. For example, the two members in a FOR
group, are assigned temporary id numbers 1 and 2. The three members in the
AGAINST group are assigned temporary id numbers 1, 2, and 3.
At any time during the 2 minute message stage, you may choose how many
votes to cast in the A election, by clicking on the arrow key. You may cast
either 1, 2, or 3 votes in this election. Any unused votes in this election will be
saved for you to use in the B election of this match.
If your proposal A value is positive, then all votes you cast will count as
YES votes for A, and if your proposal A value is negative, then all votes you
cast will count as NO votes. When you have selected the number of votes you
wish to cast in this election, please click on the “vote” button. Please record the
number of votes you cast on your record sheet. Then wait for all other voters
in the room to finish casting their Proposal A votes. The proposal passes if
there are more YES votes than NO votes. Tie votes are broken randomly by
the computer.
SECOND PPT SLIDE
The experimenter will announce when the 2 minute message stage is over.
Please make your voting decision at this time, if you have not done so already.
Once everyone has made their vote decision for the A election, the votes are
tallied and the results for your match are displayed in the results window. The
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window displays your Proposal A value, the number of votes you cast, the
total number of YES votes cast in the election, the total number of NO votes,
the outcome, and your payoff from the A election. Please record all of this
information on your record sheet.
Then click OK when you are ready to proceed to the proposal B election.
THIRD PPT SLIDE
We are now in the B election. Notice that the history screen has been up-
dated and includes a summary of the previous proposal A election. There is no
message stage for Proposal B, and your voting decision is determined completely
by how many votes you cast in the A election. But you will need to read the
information on the screen and record it. Please record your proposal B value
on your record sheet in the row labeled “Practice 1 B”. This screen reminds
you how many votes you have remaining. This number equals the number of
bonus votes you did not use for proposal A plus your regular proposal B vote.
Please record this number on your record sheet in the column labeled “your
vote”. Then click on the “Vote” button. All these votes are now automatically
cast by the computer. They are recorded as YES votes for proposal B if you
are in the FOR group, and as NO votes if you are in the AGAINST group.
FOURTH PPT SLIDE
Once everyone has made their vote decision for the B election, the votes
are tallied and the results for the people in your committee are displayed in
the results window. The screen displays the number of YES votes and the
number of NO votes, the outcome, and your payoff in francs. Please record this
information on your record sheet.
Please press OK when you are ready to proceed.
FIFTH PPT SLIDE
Once everybody has pressed OK, a new window appears and displays what
your dollar payoff would have been if this were a paid match instead of a practice
match. It also displays your total dollar payoff from all previous matches, which
so far is zero. You do not need to record your cumulative payoff after each match.
But you will need to record it at the very end of the experiment. Please press
OK when you are ready to proceed.
We have now completed the first practice match. We will now proceed to the
second practice match. Remember that you are assigned to a new committee
in this match, although you will continue to be a FOR voter if you were a FOR
voter in the first committee; you will continue to be an AGAINST voter if you
were an AGAINST voter in the first committee. Everyone is randomly assigned
to a new committee after every match in the experiment. Notice that the full-
view history contains the information about what you did in the first match.
Please raise your hand if your history screen does not show this information.
Please complete the second practice match on your own, by following the
same directions as in the first practice match. Don’t forget to record the in-
formation as it appears on your screen. Remember, you are not paid for these
practice matches. Feel free to raise your hand if you have any questions.
When everyone has made their vote decisions for proposal A and proposal B
in this practice match, and the screen with the proposal B results has appeared
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at the end of the match, please wait for further instructions. Do NOT click OK
on that screen.
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO COMPLETE PRACTICE MATCH 2]
Practice match 2 is now over. Please press OK to go to the final screen of
the practice session, displaying your payoff from the current match, and your
total payoff in the experiment so far. Do not press OK yet. You do not need
to record your total payoff because this was a practice session. You will have to
record it at the end of the paid session. Any questions?
Please press OK when you are ready to proceed.
If you have any questions from now on, raise your hand, and an experimenter
will come and assist you.
Please pull out the dividers to ensure your privacy and the privacy of others.
Please click OK and begin the first paid match.
(Play matches 1 – 20)
This completes the experiment. Please make sure to record your total payoffs
on your record sheet, including your $10 show-up fee. Please remain in your
seat and we will come by to check your total. Do not use the computers or talk
with each other. We will pay each of you in private in the next room in the
order of your seat numbers. Please sign and turn in your record sheet when you
receive payment. You are under no obligation to reveal your earnings to the
other participants. Thank you for your participation.
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